By: Hussein Al-Msallati
Abdul Hamid Dabaiba, the Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity whose mandate has expired according to the Geneva Agreement, and the Libyan House of Representatives has passed a no-confidence motion against him, the same body that granted him legitimacy. Despite this, he persists in retaining power through a series of controversial maneuvers that threaten to destabilize western Libya in particular, and the nation as a whole. His government, lacking local legitimacy, relies solely on international recognition.
To consolidate his authority, Dabaiba has sought to leverage the Presidential Council, led by Mohamed Al-Menfi, as a legislative shield. He has encouraged Al-Menfi to exceed his defined powers, which are limited to overseeing council operations and fulfilling a ceremonial role as head of state. One such instance is Resolution No. 79 of 2024, which established the National Referendum and Inquiry Commission. This commission was granted the authority to organize and oversee referenda and to announce their results. This decision demonstrates a clear violation of the constitutional declaration and the Geneva Agreement and was widely rejected by the House of Representatives and the High Council of State, Observers contend that the underlying goal of this resolution is to dissolve both the House of Representatives and the High Council of State, thereby granting absolute power to the Presidential Council—a move that could plunge the country into war.
Furthermore, Dabaiba has relied on specious arguments to justify his continued hold on power. He rejects any new transitional phases and advocates for a referendum on the draft constitution produced by the Constituent Assembly, despite its numerous legal challenges and the public’s clear objections. By clinging to this draft, Dabaiba seeks to prolong the crisis and maintain his grip on power.
Dabaiba’s maneuvers have also extended to the High Council of State. Exploiting internal divisions within the council, he is alleged to have influenced its chairman election results through bribery, with videos purporting to show these bribes widely circulated. Simultaneously, he has tried to restrict the council’s activities to prevent any potential agreement with the House of Representatives on forming a new government.
Moreover, Dabaiba has targeted the Libyan National Army with accusations that it seeks to seize power. However, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the Commander-in-Chief, has repeatedly emphasized the army’s commitment to an electoral path as the only route to establishing a democratic civil state. Haftar has also called upon Libyans to support initiatives that ensure national unity and stability.
In his bid to maintain his position, Dabaiba adopted a divisive strategy within political Islam, targeting his opponents while cultivating relationships with radical Islamists, including Sadiq Al-Ghariani the Grand Mufti appointed by the former General National Congress, infamous for issuing fatwas that incite violence.
He has also targeted the Libyan tribes with criticism, particularly in response to tribal gatherings advocating for elections and the formation of a new government—a stance that does not align with his interests.
However, He appears to be losing genuine support among Libyans. Several armed groups in Tripoli and the western region have openly withdrawn their support for him. Observers agree that the only viable solution to Libya’s crisis lies in Dabaiba stepping down, paving the way for general elections and a unified government to restore stability to the country.